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Bolivia’s New Constitution: Towards Participatory 
Democracy and Political Pluralism? 
Almut Schilling-Vacaflor 
Abstract: In Bolivia, rights to increased political participation and the recognition of indigenous politi-
cal systems are interrelated. The new constitution of 2009 defines Bolivia as a representative, participa-
tory and communitarian democracy. It incorporates enhanced mechanisms and institutions for participa-
tory democracy. Moreover, new social rights have been anchored in the constitution and a plurinational 
state is supposed to be constructed. The article raises the question of whether the new constitution will 
change the relations between state and civil society considerably and whether a new democratic model 
is being established in Bolivia. I argue that there are many limiting factors when it comes to putting the 
emancipatory elements of the constitution into practice. These include the increased strength of the 
executive branch, the intent of the government to co-opt civil society organizations and to exclude dis-
sident views, the resistance of the conservative opposition to losing some of its privileges, the deep-
rooted social inequality, the social conflicts and polarization, the resource dependence of the current 
economic model, and the authoritarian characteristics of indigenous self-governance structures. The 
article demonstrates that the new Bolivian constitution cannot create a new society but that the proc-
esses around the elaboration of a new basic law have contributed to considerable changes in the social, 
political and symbolic order. Keywords: Bolivia, constitution, participatory democracy, indigenous 
peoples, social rights, political pluralism. 
 
The new constitutions in Latin America are part of the ‘fourth wave of constitu-
tional change’, which began in the 1990s (Van Cott 2000).1 Over the last two dec-
ades, almost all Latin American states have adopted new constitutions or have sig-
nificantly changed the existing texts. These new constitutions are more political 
than their predecessors and aim to have an integrative social function. Most of the 
recent constitutional changes have been demanded ‘from below’,2 and the new 
constitutions can be seen as reactions to the multiple crises of Latin American 
states: the representation deficit of traditional political parties; the increasingly 
criticized high levels of social inequality connected with the failure of poverty re-
duction strategies; and ethnic discrimination perceived as a continuity of coloniza-
tion and social protests (see Wolff 2008, Van Cott 2000, Assies 2000) that in some 
cases have culminated in forced presidential demission (see Llanos/Marsteintredet 
2009). The new constitutions have thus been adopted with the aims of reducing the 
gap between civil society and state and to secure state stability. In some cases (e.g. 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador) they were part of ‘constitutional battles’ against op-
positional forces (see Nolte/Horn 2009).  
 Because of their common procedural and substantive characteristics, the new 
constitutions of Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2008), and Bolivia (2009)3 have been 
designated by some scholars as marking the beginning of a ‘new Andean Constitu-
tionalism’ (Noguera 2009) or of a ‘new Latin American Constitutionalism’ (No-
guera 2008, Martínez Dalmau 2008, Gargarella 2008). All of them were compiled 
by constituent assemblies and adopted in referendums, thus the degree of participa-
tion in the constitutional change processes was relatively high. At the same time, in 
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the three Andean countries the influence of the executive branch on these processes 
was significant. The new constitutional texts can be classified as ‘multicultural 
constitutions’ or, in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, as ‘plurinational constitu-
tions’ (see Yrigoyen Fajardo 2010) that strengthen the state’s control of the econ-
omy and incorporate enhanced human rights, particularly social rights, and all of 
them give more importance to participatory democracy. New state powers and in-
stitutions have been incorporated – amongst them the Poder Ciudadano in Vene-
zuela, the Función de Transparencia y Control Social in Ecuador (2008), and the 
‘new spaces for participation and social control’ at all state levels in Bolivia – and 
new mechanisms of direct democracy, such as the citizen’s legislative initiative, 
the recall referendum, and obligatory referendums for constitutional changes, have 
been inscribed. Apparently contradictory to pushing forward participatory mecha-
nisms, at the same time the three constitutional texts further increased the power of 
the executive branch (see Gargarella 2008).  
 Many authors highlight the positive characteristics and consequences of direct 
democracy. These include the improved transparency and accountability of politi-
cal parties and state institutions, decision-making based on broader civil society 
support, and increased knowledge about political issues on the part of citizens (see 
Sousa Santos 2005, 2009; Schmitter 2000). Nevertheless, there are other cases that 
point to the negative consequences of direct democracy; for example, when citi-
zens are manipulated by a one-sided communications media or political discourse, 
when certain actors instrumentalize direct democracy to gain power or when anti-
democratic societal tendencies are strengthened through participatory processes. 
Breuer (2008) argues that direct democracy in Latin America since the 1990s has 
largely been a top-down affair induced by executive-legislative conflict and that it 
has done little to foster accountability. In the academic literature we can find many 
different conceptions about the ‘right balance’ between participatory and represen-
tative elements in democracies (see Hagopian 2007). But it is undisputed that more 
research about the complex relations between societal sectors and the state is 
needed in order to understand democracies in their specific social, economic and 
cultural contexts (Tulchin/Ruthenberg 2007, Hagopian 2007). 
 This article analyses the changing democratic model in Bolivia, focusing on the 
relevant provisions of the new constitution, which aims to establish a ‘participa-
tive, representative and communitarian’ democracy (Art. 11 of the Bolivian consti-
tution), as well as on the challenges regarding its implementation. The supposed 
increase of participation and representation of civil society in Bolivian politics is 
connected with the inclusion of hitherto marginalized sectors of society as well as 
with the recognition of culturally diverse political views and systems. Thus, politi-
cal participation and political pluralism are interconnected in the Bolivian case and 
are analysed in equal measure. I will show that processes with the potential of de-
mocratizing Bolivians democracy such as the empowerment of hitherto marginal-
ized groups are being restricted and distorted in practice by countervailing tenden-
cies such as authoritarian traits of the governmental party, historical power asym-
metries, conservative oppositional forces and new exclusions of social actors. Em-
pirically, this paper is based on field research and qualitative interviews conducted in 
Bolivia between October 2005 and April 2009, particularly with leaders of indige-
nous, peasant, and unionized labour organizations; politicians; and social scientists.  
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 In the context of the recognition of (pluralist) participatory mechanisms, a cen-
tral question is whether the necessary preconditions for participation exist (see Fra-
ser 2003; Sunstein 2001, 223). In particular, the factual existence of social rights 
such as access to information, education, food, and health care is of primordial 
importance to one’s ability to exercise civil and political rights. A common charac-
teristic of Latin American states is that the ‘third wave of democratization’ (Hunt-
ington 1991) did not succeed in reducing social inequality and that high levels of 
poverty thus remained (O’Donnell et al. 2004, Wolff 2008). As poverty and politi-
cal underrepresentation are generally connected in multiple ways (see Fraser 1990, 
Bourdieu 2001), marginalized groups face the difficult task of introducing their 
visions and demands into state politics. A reflection of this interdependency in the 
Bolivian case is the fact that, until recently, the majority indigenous population4 
constituted a political minority.  
 For my analysis of the socio-political significance of the new constitution and 
in order to assess the changing relationship between state and civil society in Bo-
livia, I refer to the concept of ‘strong publics’ elaborated by Nancy Fraser (1990). 
This concept describes an alternative, post-bourgeois conception of the public 
sphere. Because of existing (more or less subtle) exclusionary mechanisms in soci-
ety and politics, Fraser proposes that the aim should not be the establishment of 
one allegedly ‘universal’ or ‘bourgeois’ public sphere; rather, many competing 
public spheres should coexist. Those ‘competing counterpublics’ comprise alterna-
tive styles of political behaviour as well as alternative norms of public speech (Fra-
ser 1990, 61). For Fraser, the existence of ‘strong publics’ entails (1) social equal-
ity as a necessary condition for political democracy, (2) multiple public spheres, 
(3) the possibility of decision making and not just opinion forming on the part of 
civil society, and thus (4) the lack of a sharp distinction between state and civil 
society. Fraser’s concepts are particularly apt to analyse changing state-civil soci-
ety relations in Bolivia, as they include three central dimensions: political partici-
pation, social equality and political pluralism (multiple political public spheres). 
A difficult history: participation and democracy in Bolivia 
Prior to the national revolution in 1952, a great majority of Bolivia’s population 
was excluded from political participation due to discriminatory legislation that 
conceded the right to elect and to be elected only to literate and salaried men. Ac-
cording to García Linera (2005, 15), from 1880 until 1951 only approximately 2 to 
3 per cent of Bolivia’s population had the factual right to vote. As in other Latin 
American states and in many countries worldwide, the model of explicitly unequal 
treatment of citizens according to certain characteristics was abandoned in Bolivia 
in the 1960s, when a homogenizing state model under which every citizen was to 
be treated equally was implemented (Kuppe 2002, Albó/Barrios 2006). Human 
rights such as the right to vote and the right to basic education were extended (at 
least theoretically) to every citizen, and enhanced social welfare policies were im-
plemented. Nevertheless, cultural diversity was not recognized, a new and re-
stricted political elite emerged, and exclusionary mechanisms were created anew or 
partly remained unchallenged. The wide gap between state and civil society as well 
as high levels of social inequality persisted despite enhanced social policies.  
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 Indigenous and campesino sectors of society were leading forces in the national 
revolution of 1952 and unionized campesino organizations were strengthened (and 
partly created) by the MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario) regime after-
wards (Rivera Cusicanqui 2003). These organizations subsequently established 
alliances with political parties as well as with the later military dictatorships (As-
sies/Salman 2005). However, the subordination and co-option of the campesino 
representatives and their demands was a common occurrence; this led to the dis-
ruption of the alliances and to the creation of new autonomous movements and 
organizations such as the Kataristas in the 1960s and the Confederación Sindical 
Única de Trabajadores del Campo de Bolivia (CSUTCB) in 1979. These highland 
organizations demanded an end to the economic discrimination they experienced as 
campesinos and to the cultural discrimination they were subjected to as members 
of indigenous communities (Albó/Barrios 2006, 121; Rivera Cusicanqui 2003) – 
or, in Fraser’s words (2003), ‘redistribution and recognition’. Other unionized 
peasant organizations, the Cocaleros (Coca Growers) and the Colonizadores 
(Colonizers), originated in the Bolivian valleys and the tropical region (particularly 
Cochabamba, Chaco, Santa Cruz, Tarija, Alto Beni) as a consequence of internal 
migration movements connected with the implementation of neoliberal policies 
that resulted in the closure of mines and other state enterprises.5 Indigenous organi-
zations also expanded in the lowlands and the Amazon region under the umbrella 
of the Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), and in 1997 the 
‘traditional’ Ayllu organizations of the highlands created the supraregional organi-
zation Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) (see 
García/Chávez/Costas 2004, 210). Thus, one should bear in mind that indigenous-
campesino movements in Bolivia should not be conceived of as a monolithic bloc 
as ‘very different concepts of ethnic-cultural consciousness and political projects 
still coexist’ (Stroebele-Gregor 1994, 5; see also Lucero 2008).  
 As of the 1990s, indigenous-campesino organizations became the driving 
forces in challenging the existing social order and demanding profound state trans-
formation (see Tapia 2007, 107). Their increasing importance was also due to fa-
vourable developments at the international and national level. These included the 
enhanced recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights in international human rights 
instruments (particularly the ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples); support for indigenous rights on the part of interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank, the UN and a large number of NGOs; 
and the ‘500-year jubilee’ of Latin American colonization in 1992, which chan-
nelled international attention to the situation of the formerly colonized populations 
(see Sieder 2002, Andolina/Laurie/Radcliffe 2009). At the state level, Bolivia was 
recognized as ‘multicultural and polyethnic’ as a result of a constitutional amend-
ment in 1994, and many rights of indigenous peoples were recognized by laws and 
decrees (see Barié 2003). Nevertheless, the existing and largely Western monocul-
tural state model remained unquestioned (see Tapia 2007). Despite the growing 
legal recognition of cultural diversity, the indigenous and campesino communities, 
particularly the women among them, were not able to considerably improve their 
living conditions. Due to policies that can be characterized as ‘neoliberal multicul-
turalism’ (Hale 2005; Assies/Salman 2005, 272), recognition was not connected 
with the redistribution of wealth and social resources.  
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 The political participation of the indigenous-campesino sectors of society at the 
municipal level was strengthened from 1994 on due to Sanchéz de Lozada’s decen-
tralization policies and the Law of Popular Participation (see Laserna 2009, Van 
Cott 2000). Moreover, relevant electoral reforms were carried out: in 1995 pro-
grammes to provide adults with identification documents in order to obtain the 
factual right to vote were implemented;6 in 1996 single-member districts were in-
troduced to elect half of the members of the Chamber of Deputies; and in 1999 the 
Law of Political Parties made it possible for civil associations and indigenous peo-
ples to nominate their own candidates (see Arnold 2004, Laserna 2009). These 
reforms – despite all their shortcomings – contributed to improving the decision-
making role of civil society at different state levels and to increasing the represen-
tativeness of Bolivia’s political system.  
 To conclude, we can recapitulate that some reforms – those made in the context 
of the national revolution, the decentralization programmes, the recognition of cul-
tural diversity, and the electoral reforms undertaken as of the 1990s – improved the 
representativeness of state institutions and the degree of participation therein. The 
heterogeneous indigenous-campesino organizations took on a growing role in for-
mal state politics (particularly at municipal level) and, by exerting pressure through 
frequent social protests, contributed to the creation of multiple public spheres. 
Nevertheless, great levels of social inequality and cultural discrimination persisted 
and the underprivileged remained underrepresented in state politics.  
The MAS government and the Constituent Assembly 
In 1995 an alliance of unionized peasant organizations (CSUTCB, Cocaleros and 
Colonizadores) founded the MAS party (at that time under the name ASP), which 
was very successful in that year’s municipal elections. In the presidential and legis-
lative elections of 1997, parties which emphasized their indigenous identity cam-
paigned for the first time at the national level, and since then it has been possible to 
observe an increasing number of indigenous-campesino representatives in state 
politics. In 2005 Evo Morales was elected president with 54 per cent of the vote. In 
order to explain this electoral victory, it is important to recall the great (and rather 
successful) social protests of 2000 (‘water war’) and 2003 (‘gas war’), as well as 
the MAS party’s ability to form alliances with different sectors of society, such as 
indigenous lowland and highland organizations, urban intellectuals and workers, 
trade unions, and leftist groups (see Van Cott 2005). Additional explanatory factors 
included the civil society’s lack of trust in traditional political parties and the press-
ing demands of the poor, who counted on Morales to give priority to their needs 
and to improve their living conditions instantly. 
 During its first period in office (2006-2010), MAS mostly carried out a ‘revolu-
tion with the ballot’, but in very delicate and conflictive situations it frequently 
resorted to the mobilization of its basis organizations in order to press for common 
aims.7 As the MAS party did not hold an absolute majority in the Chamber of 
Senators, important political changes were made by presidential decrees and 
through negotiations with the opposition in Congress and in the Constituent As-
sembly.8 There was a high degree of polarization between government and opposi-
tional forces in Bolivia, and the conflicts between them escalated in several in-
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stances, leading to violent clashes. In September 2008 oppositional groups from 
the lowland departments even occupied state institutions and destroyed the offices 
of indigenous and nongovernmental organizations. In Pando, 18 government sup-
porters were killed (UNASUR 2008). Because the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court were disabled during long periods, the opposition forces’ and the 
governing party’s scope of sanction-free action was expanded. 
 The Constituent Assembly was convened some months after Morales assumed 
the presidency. The demand for constitutional change with the broad participation 
of those who had hitherto been excluded9 had been expressed publicly with great 
repercussion by the indigenous lowland organizations in their IV protest march of 
2002 (Romero 2005, 155ff). Afterwards it had been adopted by the highland in-
digenous-campesino organizations. Hence, during the ‘gas war’ the main demands 
(the ‘Agenda of October’) had been the nationalization of hydrocarbon resources 
and the drafting of a new constitution. The indigenous-campesino organizations 
had originally demanded that civil society organizations and not political parties 
should develop the new constitution (see Artículo Primero 2005). This demand was 
due to the poor reputation of political parties and the idea that the ‘pure’ and sover-
eign participation of civil society should not be ‘contaminated’ or co-opted by 
party politics. There had also been an agreement between MAS and the indigenous 
organizations that stipulated that indigenous representatives would be granted 16 
reserved seats in the Constituent Assembly. This agreement was broken by MAS 
when it passed the law calling the elections for the Constituent Assembly; its stra-
tegic aim in doing so was to concentrate the votes for its own party. It was thus 
practically impossible for indigenous-campesino groups to nominate candidates for 
the assembly without allying with a political party (particularly the MAS party). 
The Constituent Assembly offered MAS the possibility to carry out profound state 
reforms that would not have been possible in the opposition-dominated Congress. 
The governing party managed to obtain a large number of assembly seats: 137 of 
255 delegates were affiliated with MAS. Many of the MAS delegates (approxi-
mately 60, interview with General Secretary Isaac Ávalos 2007) stemmed from its 
founder organizations CSUTCB, Cocaleros and Colonizadores. The indigenous 
lowland organizations and CONAMAQ had far fewer representatives in the as-
sembly (four and eight delegates respectively), largely due to their more distant 
relations with the government. Consequently, they were not able to introduce their 
demands to the same extent as the organizations closer to MAS had done, and they 
frequently expressed their discontent with the constitutional reform process (inter-
views with Nélida Faldin 2007 and Samuel Flores 2007).10  
 During the Constituent Assembly sessions there was considerable tension and 
conflict between the MAS party and unionized peasant organizations on the one 
side and the indigenous lowland and Ayllu organizations on the other. The reasons 
for these tensions were the divergent aims and strategies of these groups for the 
transformation of the Bolivian state: while the priority of the indigenous lowland 
and Ayllu organizations was to achieve the creation of strong self-governed entities 
(with respect to land rights and rights to natural resources) and secure direct repre-
sentation in state institutions, the MAS party and the peasant organizations aspired 
to the construction of a new state hegemony and the strengthening of the national 
level. Despite frequent conflicts, the indigenous-campesino organizations allied to 
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form a ‘Unity Pact’ and were able to develop common documents with political-
juridical demands for the new constitution that were then used as the basis of the 
MAS party’s proposals. In addition to the criticism regarding the exclusionary and 
homogenizing tendencies of the MAS party, a widespread critique was that the 
political parties tried to influence and control the Constituent Assembly in order to 
achieve their own aims (see Tapia 2006b and 2007). In the end the subordination 
of constituent power to the constituted powers became very clear as more than 100 
articles of the assembly’s draft constitution were changed by Congress delegates.11  
The new constitution: participatory and pluralist democracy 
The constitution of Bolivia can be designated a ‘transformative Constitution’ (see 
Sunstein 2001, 224) as it strives to change the existing political, economic, social, 
symbolic, and legal order. In the first article, it recognizes Bolivia as a plurina-
tional state with ‘political pluralism’. Article 7 establishes that the state’s sover-
eignty is based on the Bolivian populace and is exercised in both a direct and a 
delegated way. New mechanisms and institutions of participatory democracy have 
been incorporated into the new constitution. Moreover, enhanced human rights and 
mechanisms to guarantee their effective implementation have been inscribed. 
Participatory democracy 
Bolivia’s type of democracy is elucidated in Art. 11, and characterized as ‘partici-
patory, representative and communitarian’. The representative form of democracy 
is exercised through universal, direct, and secret elections. The mechanisms of di-
rect and participatory democracy under the new Bolivian constitution are the refer-
endum, the legislative initiative of citizens, the recall referendum for public ser-
vants, the assembly, the city council and the previous consultation.12 Moreover, the 
new constitution establishes that members of the judicial branch, after pre-selection 
by the legislative branch, will be elected by the Bolivian populace (Art. 182, 188, 
194, 198). Articles 240 and 241 stipulate that the Bolivian population, represented 
by the ‘organized civil society’, is supposed to participate in the design of public 
politics and to execute social control at every state level. A Law of Social Control 
shall be passed, and new spaces for participation and social control shall by created 
by state entities. The participatory rights and the codetermination of ‘organized 
civil society’ are also mentioned with regard to the health system, the educational 
system, the (plural) economic system, environmental protection, and other issues 
(Art. 40, 78-93, 309, 343).  
Communitarian democracy 
The recognition of ‘communitarian democracy’ is an innovation of the new consti-
tution and is supposed to be exercised in self-governed indigenous-campesino enti-
ties such as municipalities and indigenous-campesino territories (TIOC). The elec-
tion or designation of indigenous-campesino representatives in those entities 
should take place according to the communities’ own norms and procedures. In-
digenous peoples’ and communities’ right to self-determination has been incorpo-
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rated into the new constitution and, like the provisions in international instruments 
(particularly the ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration about the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples), comprises two dimensions: the right to self-government exe-
cuted within the framework of indigenous autonomy, including the exercise of in-
digenous political, juridical, and economic systems, and the right to fully partici-
pate in state institutions and in the dominant society (Art. 30).  
 The new Bolivian constitution foresees the creation of indigenous-campesino 
autonomies (Art. 289-296, 304). The rights of indigenous peoples anchored in the 
constitution have been extended to campesino communities as well as to the Afro-
Bolivians (Art. 32). With regard to the representation of indigenous-campesino 
peoples and communities in the legislative branch, Art. 147 stipulates ‘that the 
proportional participation of indigenous-campesino peoples and communities will 
be guaranteed’ and that quotas stipulating a certain number of indigenous represen-
tatives will be implemented.13 Article 210 establishes that the organization and 
functioning of indigenous-campesino organizations, as well as of citizen associa-
tions and political parties, must be democratic and that the electoral organ will su-
pervise the election of indigenous-campesino authorities and representatives (Art. 
211). In this context, the crucial question is which criteria will be applied to define 
whether the ‘communitarian democracy’ is democratic enough.14 Concepts such as 
‘communitarian democracy’ and ‘vivir bien’ have also been developed by indige-
nous-campesino organizations and their allies to countervail Western concepts of 
democracy and of a ‘good life’. Thus, they are seen by these actors as part of an 
ongoing decolonization and emancipation process.  
Human rights and the ‘good life’ 
In comparison to the former constitution, Bolivia’s new constitution supports en-
hanced human rights, particularly economic, social, and cultural rights and the 
rights of underprivileged groups such as women, children, persons with disabili-
ties, and elderly persons. For example, women’s right to equal political participa-
tion (Art. 8, 11, 26, 147 and 210)15 and other women’s human rights are now in-
cluded. New mechanisms have been introduced to complement the already existing 
legal procedures16 for guaranteeing the implementation of human rights: the ‘Ac-
tion of Unconstitutionality’, meant to work against unconstitutional legal norms 
(Art. 132-133); the ‘Action of Compliance’, to penalize public servants who do not 
fulfil constitutional provisions (Art. 134); and the ‘Popular Action’, intended to 
address the violation of collective rights and interests (Art. 135-136). The new con-
stitution proclaims that its primary aim is to achieve the ‘good life’ (vivir bien). 
This concept incorporates elements of indigenous philosophies, but as it remains 
very vague, it is apt to be used in a strategic way depending on the context. Never-
theless, we can find certain consensus that a ‘good life’ contains human rights 
(with a greater priority on second and third generation rights than in traditional 
interpretations), political participation and pluralism, a low degree of social ine-
quality and a shift from an anthropocentric to a holistic worldview (Acosta 2009). 
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Tensions between legal norms and socio-political realities 
Constitutions are powerful instruments that shape political and social orders, partly 
due to their formalization and homologation effects: ‘By ordaining the patterns that 
govern behaviour in practice, prior to any legal discourse, through the objectivity 
of a written rule or of an explicitly expressed regulation, formalization establishes 
the operation of what might be a homologation effect’ (Bourdieu 1987, 840-849). 
According to Beau Breslin (2009, 4), constitutions are ‘documents that use words 
to create worlds’. Nevertheless, the implementation of constitutions relies on many 
context-specific factors, such as political will, power relations, social acceptance of 
legal norms, and the legitimacy of the constitutional change process (Ginsberg et 
al. 2009, Van Cott 2000, Habermas 1992). As examples like Colombia show, a 
new constitution that foresees important reforms will not necessarily have the de-
sired impact, for example, when the particular socio-political context is obstructive 
to social change. Moreover, mechanisms of participatory democracy are not posi-
tive per se, but should be assessed according to their meaning in a specific context. 
In the last months in Bolivia, several laws were passed in order to institutionalize 
and implement those provisions of the new constitution regarding a participatory 
and pluralist democracy (amongst them the law of autonomy and decentralization, 
the laws of the judicial branch and the constitutional court, the law for the electoral 
branch and the electoral regime), and further laws and decrees are still supposed to 
be passed. The constitution and the new laws are to be transformed from legal 
norms into legal realities, but there are many challenges on the way. I argue that 
the question of whether current developments in Bolivia are contributing to the 
establishment of a participatory and pluralist democracy needs to be examined in a 
nuanced manner. 
The MAS party and civil society organizations 
The MAS party most certainly has strong connections with civil society organiza-
tions, and in its first term it frequently mobilized this support base in order to press 
for political-juridical reforms. It used to present itself as the ‘government of the 
social movements’ and of the indigenous-campesino sectors of society, as if these 
groups made up a homogeneous block of society with MAS at the top. This self-
representation obscured the fact that it has much closer relations to some social 
organizations than to others (see Escarzága 2009, Schilling-Vacaflor 2010). Using 
Fraser’s (1990, 67) words, we could say that the MAS ‘masks domination by ab-
sorbing the less powerful into a false “we” that reflects the more powerful’. Hence, 
the inclusion of hitherto underrepresented sectors of society has also produced new 
exclusions, as not all of these sectors have been represented equally. Examples 
such as the Constituent Assembly, described in Section 2 of this article, the adop-
tion of the new electoral law in 2009 and the new laws of 2010, as well as other 
current developments show that MAS favours political forces close to it while 
marginalizing the representation and demands of other sectors of society (Zegada 
2008, 14; Tapia 2006a).17 Van Cott (2008, 208) describes similar dynamics in the 
monopolization of power and the exclusion of dissidents in MAS-dominated mu-
nicipalities. For these reasons, indigenous lowland organizations, Ayllu organiza-
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tions, and feminist groups have published several resolutions and statements that 
have expressed their discontent with MAS’s exclusionary activities 
(CIDOB/CONAMAQ 2007, CONAMAQ 2008 and 2009, CIDOB 2010, Mujeres 
Creando 2007). In this context, the question of who will represent ‘organized civil 
society’ for political participation when it comes to putting the new constitution 
into practice will be of crucial importance. 
 During the MAS government’s first term one could observe that when conflicts 
escalated, many different social forces supported the governing party in order to 
fight against the conservative opposition; after the conflicts had subsided, however, 
some of these groups again became rather distant from and critical of MAS. MAS 
has tended to co-opt civil society organizations, and in many cases, the positions 
and activities of MAS-related organizations are directed ‘from above’. Representa-
tives from diverse social organizations and movements are forced to make agree-
ments with MAS in order to increase their chances of achieving their political-
juridical objectives (see Escarzága 2009, 90; Tapia 2006b). The fact that many 
leading representatives of indigenous-campesino organizations are part of the gov-
ernment further contributes to this co-option.18 In this context, Fraser’s (1990) as-
sumption that there should not be a wide gap between civil society and the state 
can be questioned, as closeness between the two spheres could also point to the co-
option of the former – thus, some kind of autonomy for civil society might be 
necessary.  
 One of the MAS party’s frequent challenges is to balance the need to mediate 
between different sectors of society (as well as to negotiate with international ac-
tors) and take divergent interests into account, and the need to retain as much 
power as possible. If we adopt Fraser’s perspective, we can argue that civil society 
participation in Bolivia has been strengthened under Morales since representatives 
of hitherto marginalized groups now play an important role in Bolivian politics. 
Nevertheless, certain sectors of society have been included to a far greater extent 
than others. Moreover, the decision-making power of society is being limited by 
the homogenizing and partly authoritarian tendencies of the current government.  
 Political parties and social movements operate according to different logics (see 
Bourdieu 2001). These divergences can be observed in the case of the representa-
tives of social organizations that have assumed posts inside MAS; they are then in 
the difficult position of needing to simultaneously be loyal to their support base 
and to the party they represent. Indigenous-campesino organizations generally ex-
pect their representatives to, first of all, press for their particular interests; this con-
tributes to clientelistic and corporativist structures and is accompanied by the risk 
that the representatives will be designated as ‘betrayers’ if the demands of the sup-
port base are not given highest priority. In this context the newly introduced recall 
referendum, which was introduced into the constitution in order to increase the 
accountability of political actors, is apt to place additional pressure on the repre-
sentatives of civil society organizations and to reinforce clientelism. The expecta-
tion from social organizations that their former members should primarily repre-
sent their particular interests on the one hand and the fact that members of the gov-
erning party should not privilege certain groups excessively on the other often cre-
ate delicate situations for representatives of civil society organizations who assume 
political positions.  
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Participatory democracy and the concentration of power 
The MAS party’s strategy of concentrating power and thereby excluding pluralism 
was quite obvious during the constitutional change process and it is even getting 
clearer in the second mandate of Evo Morales. The electoral designs favoured by 
MAS in its first term (and those anchored in the new constitution) tended to pro-
duce bipartisan rather than pluralist political compositions. The new constitutional 
text strengthened the presidential democratic system, governmental representatives 
tried to influence the Constituent Assembly, and polarizing discourses villainizing 
the ‘enemies of the change process’ were frequent. The governing party (such as 
the oppositional forces) in many cases overrode legal regulations and marginalized 
minority views (see Asbún Rojas 2008). In the second term – characterized by in-
creased power of the executive branch, a two-third majority in the legislative 
branch and intents to dominate the judicial branch and to use it as a tool against 
opposition19 – exclusionary and authoritarian tendencies of MAS’ government are 
becoming more pronounced and more frequently directed against ‘internal ene-
mies’ and former allies. 20  
 In a recent article, Bolivia’s vice president García Linera quotes Robespierre’s 
description of a ‘revolutionary government’ in order to describe his own government:  
The objective of a constitutional government is to conserve the Republic; the 
objective of a revolutionary government is to found it. […] The revolutionary 
government needs extraordinary activities, precisely because it is in a situation 
of war. Therefore it is subject to less uniform and less rigorous rules […] The 
constitutional government is principally occupied with civil liberty; the revolu-
tionary government with public liberty. In situations of a constitutional regime 
it is practically sufficient to protect the individuals from the abuse of public 
power; under a revolutionary regime the public power must defend itself from 
all of the social forces by whom it is attacked (Robespierre as cited in García 
Linera 2010; translated by the author).  
The quotation’s main argument as applied in the Bolivian context is that the goal of 
profound change and state transformation (as well as that of securing governmental 
power) legitimizes procedural irregularities or authoritarian postures. From the 
perspective of the Bolivian government, a certain degree of authoritarianism may 
be necessary in order to secure governability and carry out profound transforma-
tions against the will of a powerful opposition, as well as in the face of limiting 
factors connected with Bolivia’s existence as a peripheral state. But it seems to also 
have an intrinsic origin based on authoritarian tendencies inside MAS and its 
founding unionized campesino organizations. From the perspective of indigenous-
campesino organizations, the flouting of certain democratic and legal rules can also 
be justified with the argument that until recently democracy represented an exclu-
sive and discriminatory pact of the ruling elite and that many times the rule of law 
primarily served the interests of the rich (see Gray Molina 2007). Many members 
of indigenous-campesino sectors of society may now be unwilling to fully respect 
governance models which in the past served to repress their aims of emancipation, 
and which were perceived as externally imposed (neo)colonial or imperialist power 
structures.  
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 Roberto Laserna (2009, 141) states that under the MAS government, too much 
emphasis on participation has caused institutional erosion and a lack of checks and 
balances. According to my point of view, this critique is accurate, but perhaps the 
debilitation of the existing order and the corresponding institutions was a necessary 
precondition to constructing a new social and institutional order. Thus, the creation 
of new checks and balances will depend on the construction of a new institutional 
and social order. A crucial question is whether this new order will be characterized 
by authoritarian and centralized structures under MAS or by openness to divergent 
(internal and external) views and the existence of new checks and balances.  
 During MAS’s first term, the political participation of civil society in state poli-
tics was certainly much greater than under former governments, but in some cases 
this participation was used primarily to override the resistance of the conservative 
opposition. García Linera (2010) distinguishes between different periods of state 
crisis since 2000. According to his analysis, in 2008 the ‘moment of bifurcation’ 
took place, leading to the current phase: the consolidation of a new political and 
symbolic state order. The question which thus arises is whether a relatively high 
level of political participation is only of particular importance during crisis periods 
and whether it declines afterwards. Furthermore, now that the MAS party has a 
two-thirds majority in the legislative branch and Evo Morales has assigned impor-
tant functionaries to the judicial branch (which could be seen as the politicization 
of the judicial branch), participatory mechanisms could lose importance.21  
Political pluralism 
The official implementation of self-government for indigenous peoples and com-
munities and the creation of plurinational and intercultural institutions according to 
the new constitution will be important tasks in Morales’ second term. It is probable 
that at the local and regional levels contests over political and economic power 
between different social forces will take place and will shape state politics and the 
correlation of power. One unresolved question regarding the implementation of 
self-governed and autonomous entities is how to ensure that the collective right to 
self-determination will not restrict internal participation. To what extent will the 
self-governed spaces reflect different and heterogeneous views, for example, those 
of minorities and of women? Abuses and repressive mechanisms in the name of 
self-governance should be prevented, but at the same time the regulations should 
not be imposed externally ‘from above’. This topic is exceptionally relevant as 
indigenous-campesino communities are frequently criticized for authoritarian, sex-
ist, and homogenizing tendencies. Stroebele-Gregor (2008) states that the political 
systems of indigenous-campesino communities in Bolivia that strive to reach a 
consensus usually exclude divergent views; in the event that opposing views are 
expressed, separatist processes or strong social conflicts can occur. In addition to 
those of the indigenous-campesino autonomies and communities, democratic struc-
tures at the departmental level should also be strengthened – something which will 
be especially challenging in those departments where conservative elites with ex-
tensive economic resources retain power and are not willing to give up their privi-
leged positions.  
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 The creation of intercultural state institutions is another challenging task related 
to the implementation of the new constitution. Despite the fact that the provisions 
of the new constitution (and of the electoral law) foresee the increased participation 
of members of indigenous-campesino communities and women in state institutions 
(something which is already taking place), the concrete design of those institutions 
is still not fixed. One obstacle to creating intercultural and inclusive institutions is 
that the participation of members of different cultures or those from underprivi-
leged sectors of society in the institutions created by dominant sectors of society 
alone does not necessarily make these structures egalitarian. Or, in the words of 
Fraser (1990, 64): ‘Subordinated groups sometimes cannot find the right voice or 
words to express their thoughts, and when they do, they discover they are not 
heard. […] They alert us to the ways in which social inequalities can infect delib-
eration, even in the absence of any formal exclusions’. At the institutional level 
subtle mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination will still persist and should be 
debated and confronted explicitly. 
Social rights and social inequality 
The new constitution and the current government declare the ‘good life’ of all citi-
zens to be their primary aim. Even though there may be a great distance between 
the promising and utopian character of the new constitution on the one hand and 
social reality (see Nolte/Horn 2009) on the other, the extended recognition of hu-
man rights is of importance. This restricts governments’ room to manoeuvre, can 
aid in criticizing deficient implementation processes, and establishes long-term 
goals. Accordingly, Bolivia’s new constitution could turn out to be the ‘law of the 
weaker’ and reduce social inequality and poverty. The nationalization of the coun-
try’s hydrocarbon resources under Morales has increased the state budget signifi-
cantly and strengthened the state’s role in the economy. At the same time, new 
social welfare policies have been implemented: the raising of the minimum wage, 
the creation of several aid funds (for children, women, and elderly people), the 
execution of literacy programmes, and increased support for Bolivia’s health and 
education systems. Still, the economic impact of the reforms undertaken since 
1994 and of the social welfare policies implemented under Morales has been far 
more modest than their political impact (see Laserna 2009, 134).  
 The challenge in the MAS government’s current term will be to rapidly and 
significantly improve the living conditions of the poor (see MAS-IPSP 2009). 
However, it appears that the government’s actions will not affect the rich consid-
erably: last year’s experiences, particularly with respect to the intended redistribu-
tion of land, demonstrated that the scope of action for redistribution processes that 
do not risk generating political instability is quite narrow. The priority of the gov-
ernmental plan for 2010-2015 is to obtain great benefits from natural resource ex-
ploitation in order to finance ambitious social welfare policies. In the context of 
MAS’s resource-dependent economic policy we can observe strong tensions, for 
example, between resource exploitation and environmental protection (see Gudy-
nas 2009) as well as between long-term economic strategies such as the diversifica-
tion of economy and the demands of the poor to rapidly improve their living 
conditions.  
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Conclusions 
In some Andean-Amazonian countries we can observe the beginning of a specific 
‘new constitutionalism’ which involves many innovative elements. The new con-
stitutions of Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia represent the intent to overcome the 
deficiencies of the previous democratic models, which were characterized by a 
wide gap between state and civil society, high levels of social inequality, and defi-
cient recognition of cultural diversity. Similar to the new constitutions of Ecuador 
and Venezuela, the new Bolivian constitution strengthens the mechanisms of par-
ticipatory democracy, recognizes enhanced social rights, and aims to establish a 
plurinational and intercultural state. One of its primary objectives is to redefine 
relations between the state and an ethnically pluralist civil society, giving civil so-
ciety a greater say in state politics. Thus, Bolivia’s basic law can be characterized 
as a transformative and emancipatory constitution. Nevertheless, the actual signifi-
cance of a legal norm can only be assessed in its concrete socio-political context.  
 In Bolivia, the constitutional change process against the will of the powerful 
elite has served to bring about profound transformations, which would not have 
been possible using ordinary political channels. The MAS party used the develop-
ment of the new constitution to consolidate its hegemony. The influence of the 
political parties on the Constituent Assembly was great, and a majority of the as-
sembly deputies belonged to the MAS party. This fact partly explains the appar-
ently paradoxical outcome that the new constitution strengthens participatory de-
mocracy on the one hand and the executive branch on the other. There has been a 
tendency on the part of the MAS party and its affiliates at the national and subna-
tional levels to exclude divergent views and to co-opt diverse social forces. The 
article’s findings suggest that there are tensions between the MAS party’s goal of 
concentrating power and the strengthening of a new pluralist and participatory 
model of democracy in Bolivia. Thus, the decision-making role of civil society and 
the construction of multiple public spheres – according to Fraser, central character-
istics of ‘strong publics’ – are restrained by the aspirations of the government as 
well as by the conservative opposition, which strives to maintain its own 
privileges.  
 The recognition of indigenous-campesino self-governing entities and their par-
ticipation in state politics has the potential to contribute to the building of multiple 
public spheres. However, many indigenous-campesino systems have authoritarian 
and sexist characteristics that should not be overlooked. The creation of intercul-
tural institutions is another challenging task for the future that remains largely un-
resolved. Many social programmes have been implemented, but the degree to 
which they will bring about long-term structural change is unclear. A difficulty in 
this context is the immense social pressure to obtain fast, visible results and the 
MAS party’s opportunity to obtain voter support through assistentialist, short-term 
policies on the one hand and environmental criteria and long-term policies, such as 
economic diversification, on the other.  
 We have been able to observe many considerable improvements regarding the 
participation of civil society in state politics and the representativeness of state 
institutions in Bolivia, but there are still many obstacles to the development of an 
increasingly participatory and pluralist democracy. Despite the adoption of a new 
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constitution which contains many emancipatory elements, the findings of this arti-
cle demonstrate that diverse social and political factors may restrain its impact in 
practice. Similar to the experiences of the other countries of the ‘new Andean con-
stitutionalism’, the Bolivian example shows that a new legal norm cannot create a 
new society; however, it can help to transform it.  
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1. All waves of constitutional change occurred after profound crises, the first one in the period 1789-
1799, the second one in the period 1914-1926 and the third one in the period 1945-1965 (Van Cott 
2000, 11). 
2. In the case of Venezuela the demand for a new constitution gained importance during the ‘Cara-
cazo’ in 1989; soon after this, a commission elaborated a draft proposal of a new constitution. Due 
to the lack of political will of the following ruling parties, it was not until Hugo Chavéz assumed 
the presidency that the constitution was actually renewed (see Combellas 2005). In Ecuador before 
1998, the demand for a new constitution was particularly pushed forward by the indigenous move-
ments and grew in a context of discontent with the ruling elites and presidential breakdowns. The 
Bolivian case will be described more in detail in this article.  
3. The constitution of Colombia (1991) already incorporated extended mechanisms of participatory 
democracy and social rights. It can be seen as a forerunner for the ‘new Latin American constitu-
tionalism’. The 1991 constitution of Colombia as well as the Ecuadorean constitution of 1998 con-
tained the apparently contradictory characteristics to improve human rights on the one side and neo-
liberalism on the other side (Rodríguez Garavito 2009, Andolina 2003). The new constitution of 
Perú (1993) was passed during the Fujimori dictatorship and contains many repressive elements 
such as very restrictive anti-terrorist provisions as well as a neoliberal economic orientation. Thus, 
it is not considered as part of the ‘new Latin American constitutionalism’.  
4. Sixty-two per cent of the Bolivian population identified themselves as indigenous in the national 
census of 2001 (see www.cne.org.bo). 
5. The Colonizadores organization was, until recently, known as CSCB (Confederación Sindical de 
Colonizadores de Bolivia – Confederation of Colonizer Unions of Bolivia). As the term Ǯcolonizersǯ 
has many negative associations in the Bolivian context, the name has now been changed to Confed-
eración Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (CSCIB; Confederation of Intercultural 
Communities of Bolivia) (see www.cscbbol.org). 
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6. Even in the 1997 elections, 81.2 per cent of lowland indigenous citizens did not have an identity 
card and were thus excluded from exercising their right to vote (Van Cott 2005, 76).  
7. According to Van Cott (2005, 213), political parties that emphasize their indigenous identity are not 
a substitute for social movements and indigenous organizations; however, the parliamentary chan-
nel is complementary to mobilization. 
8. For example, in order to obtain the necessary support in the legislative branch for the law to elect 
the members of the Constituent Assembly, the demand from the opposition to hold a referendum 
about departmental autonomies was accepted and the Assembly elections and the referendum fi-
nally both took place 2 July 2006.  
9. This is in contrast to the last constitutional reforms, which were carried out by a small number of 
experts and politicians in a rather non-transparent way (see Van Cott 2000 on the constitutional re-
form of 1994). 
10. Of the Constituent Assembly delegates, 55.7 per cent (142 Asambleístas) expressed that they identi-
fied themselves as indigenous, 124 with an indigenous highland population and 18 with an indige-
nous lowland group. 69.9 per cent of MAS representatives declared themselves as belonging to an 
indigenous highland group and 3.7 per cent to a lowland population (see Schilling-Vacaflor 2010).  
11. Amongst the concessions were restrictions of participatory mechanisms and the role of civil society 
organizations in state politics; a strengthening of the competences of the departmental autonomies; 
the application of the new limits of land property (5,000 or 10,000 hectares) only to future land ti-
tles and not to already existing ones; and restrictions of the indigenous jurisdictions.  
12. The recall referendum (for every state functionary except those in the judicial branch, Art. 240), the 
city council, and the previous consultation were not part of the former constitutional text. 
13. Transitional Electoral Law No. 4021 incorporates the election of seven indigenous representatives, 
which is a much smaller number than the indigenous lowland and Ayllu organizations originally 
demanded (CIDOB 2001; CONAMAQ 2006). 
14. Without dealing with the differences between the (heterogeneous and dynamic) political systems of 
indigenous-campesino communities and Western-liberal models of democracy in detail, it is worth 
considering that political decisions in indigenous-campesino communities in the Bolivian Andes 
and valleys are taken in community assemblies. The aim is to reach a consensus, positions are filled 
on a rotating basis, and in many cases a position is assumed by a couple (a practice called Chacha-
Warmi or Qhari-Warmi) (see Albó 2002). 
15. But this was without a guaranteed quota for female representatives, something which was de-
manded by several women’s organizations during the constitutional change process.  
16. This was the ‘Action of Liberty’ (Habeas corpus, Art. 125-127), ‘Constitutional Complaint’ for 
cases of human rights violations (Art. 128-129); and ‘Action of Privacy Protection’ (Habeas data, 
Art. 130-131) 
17. Examples for these dynamics are abundant: in many circumscriptions in the municipal and depart-
mental elections of April 2010, MAS did not respect candidates who were elected by usos y cos-
tumbres and imposed its own candidates; social organizations such as CONAMAQ complained that 
they were not consulted regarding the new laws (see www.conamaq.org.bo, accessed 3 March 
2010); the number of indigenous representatives in the legislative branch elected in indigenous cir-
cumscriptions remains lower than it had been promised (Albó 2010); and the CIDOB march in June 
2010 for land rights, rights regarding the exploitation of natural resources and indigenous autono-
mies with broad competences was discredited by MAS, who publicly alleged that the protest march 
was contrived by USAID.  
18. For example, the former general secretary of CSUTCB, Isaac Avalos, and the general secretary of 
the CSCIB, Fidel Surco, assumed positions as senators in 2010.  
19. See Human Rights Council (2010). 
20. See Espinoza (2010).  
21. For example, the MAS government programme from 2010 to 2015 (MAS-IPSP 2009) does not 
highlight political participation as a primary aim. 
 
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 90, April 2011  |  19 
 
Bibliography  
Acosta, Alberto (2009) ‘Das Buen Vivir. Die Schaffung einer Utopie’, Juridikum – Zeitschrift für Kritik/ 
Recht/Gesellschaft, 4, pp. 219-223. 
Albó, Xavier (2002) Pueblos indios en la política. La Paz: Plural/CIPCA. 
––– (2010) ‘Ley Electoral y minorías indígenas’, online document, http://www.cidob-bo.org (accessed 
1 July 2010).  
Albó, Xavier; and Franz Barrios Suvelza (2006) Por una Bolivia plurinacional e intercultural con auto-
nomías. La Paz: IDH Bolivia. 
Andolina, Robert (2003) ‘The Sovereign and its Shadow’, Journal of Latin American Studies, No. 35; 
pp. 721-750.  
Andolina, Robert; Nina Laurie, Sarah Radcliffe (2009) Indigenous Development in the Andes. Culture, 
Power and Transnationalism. Durham/London: Duke University Press.  
Aparicio, Marco Wilhelmi (2008) ‘Derechos: enunciación y principios de aplicación’. In: R. Ávila, A. 
Grijalva, and R. Martínez (eds) Desafíos constitucionales. La constitución ecuatoriana del 2008 en 
perspectiva. Quito: Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos y Tribunal Constitucional, pp. 19-
39. 
Arnold, Denise (2004) Pueblos indígenas y originarios de Bolivia. Hacia su soberanía y legitimidad 
electoral. Bolivia: Corte Nacional Electoral. 
Artículo Primero (2005) Asamblea constituyente. Otra Bolivia es posible. Santa Cruz: CEJIS. 
Asbún Rojas, José Antonio (2008) ‘Una democracia plena requiere de una participación plena’. In: 
IDEA (ed.) Comentarios a la propuesta constitucional aprobada por la Asamblea Constituyente 
boliviana. La Paz: Plural, pp. 167-172. 
Assies, Willem (2000) ‘Indigenous peoples and reform of the State in Latin America’. In: Willem As-
sies, Gemma Van der Haar and André Hoekema (eds) The Challenge of Diversity. Indigenous Peo-
ples and Reforms of the State in Latin America. Amsterdam: THELA THESIS, pp. 3-22. 
Assies, Willem; and Ton Salman (2005) ‘Ethnicity and Politics in Bolivia’, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 4, No. 3, 
pp. 269-297.  
Barié, Cletus Gregor (2003) Pueblos indígenas y derechos constitucionales en América Latina: un 
panorama. Bolivia: Editorial Abya-Yala. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1987) ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’, The Hastings 
Law Journal, Vol. 38, pp. 805-853. 
––– (2001) El campo político. La Paz: Plural.  
Breslin, Beau (2009) From Words to Worlds. Exploring Constitutional Functionality. Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press. 
Breuer, Anita (2008) ‘The Problematic Relation between Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin 
America: Evidence from the Bolivian Case’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, 
pp. 1-23.  
CIDOB (2001) Propuesta sobre las reformas a la constitución política del estrado. Santa Cruz: Unpu-
blished Statement. 
––– (2010) Resolusion de la II comisión nacional. Riberalta, online document, http://www.cidob-bo.org 
(accessed 7 March 2010). 
CIDOB/CONAMAQ (July 2007) Informe-Recomendaciones. Sucre: Unpublished Statement. 
Combellas, Ricardo (2005) ‘El proceso constituyente y la constitución de 1999’. In: Elena Plaza, Ricar-
do Combellas (eds) Procesos Constituyentes y Reformas Constitucionales en la Historia de Vene-
zuela: 1811-1999. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, pp. 765-807. 
CONAMAQ (2006) Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional Qullasuyu. Bolivia: Unpublished 
Statement. 
––– (2008) A la opinión pública nacional e internacional. El CONAMAQ ante la coyuntura actual. 
Cochabamba: Unpublished Statement. 
––– (2009) Resolusion, online document, http://www.conamaq.org.bo (accessed 7 March 2010). 
Escárzaga, Fabiola (2009) ‘Die Regierung der sozialen Bewegungen’. In: Tanja Ernst and Stefan 
Schmalz (eds) Die Neugründung Boliviens? Die Regierung Morales. Baden-Baden: Nomos.  
Espinoza, Daniela (2010) ‘Ahora el MAS busca el enemigo en casa’. In: Pulso semanario, online 
20  |  Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 90, abril de 2011 
 
document, http://www.pulsobolivia.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3967: 
ahora-el-mas-busca-el-enemigo-en-casa&catid=170:informacion (accessed 22 September 2010).  
Fraser, Nancy (1990) ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere. A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Exist-
ing Democracy’, Social Text, Vol. 25/26, pp. 56-80. 
––– (2003) ‘Soziale Gerechtigkeit im Zeitalter der Identitätspolitik’. In: Nancy Fraser and Axel Hon-
neth (eds) Umverteilung oder Anerkennung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 13-128. 
García Linera, Alvaro; Marxa Chávez León, and Patricia Costas Monje (eds) (2004) Sociología de los 
movimientos sociales en Bolivia. Estructuras de movilización, repertorios culturales y acción polí-
tica. La Paz: Plural. 
García Linera, Álvaro (2005) Estado multinacional. Una propuesta democrática para la extinción de la 
exclusión de las naciones indias. Editorial Malatesta: La Paz. 
––– (2010) ‘El estado en transición. Bloque de poder y punto de bifurcación’. In: Álvaro García Linera, 
Raúl Prada, Luís Tapia, and Oscar Vega Camacho (eds) El Estado. Campo de Lucha. La Paz: Mue-
la del Diablo, pp. 9-43. 
Gargarella, Roberto (2008) ‘Cambiar la letra, cambiar el mundo’, Ecuador Debate, Vol. 75, pp. 93-96. 
Ginsberg, Tom; Zachary Elkins, and Justin Blount (2009) ‘Does the Process of Constitution-Making 
Matter?’ Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 5, pp. 201-223.  
Gray Molina, Jorge (ed.) (2007) El estado de la opinión. Informe sobre desarrollo humano en Bolivia. 
La Paz: PNUD Bolivia. 
Gudynas, Eduardo (2009) ‘Politische Ökologie: Natur in den Verfassungen von Bolivien und Ecuador’, 
Juridikum – Zeitschrift für Kritik/Recht/Gesellschaft, Vol. 4, pp. 214-218. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1992) Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des de-
mokratischen Rechtsstaats. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.  
Hagopian, Frances (2007) ‘Latin American Citizenship and Democratic Theory’ In: Joseph Tulchin and 
Meg Ruthenberg (eds) Citizenship in Latin America. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
pp. 11-56.  
Hale, Charles (2005) ‘Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Domi-
nance in Central America’, Political and Legal Anthropology Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 10-28.  
Human Rights Council (2010) ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
the Activities of Her Office in the Plurinational State of Bolivia’, A/HRC/13/26/Add.2. 
Huntington, Samuel (1991) ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 12-34.  
Kuppe, René (2002) ‘Indianische Rechte und Partizipation im Rahmen der Verwirklichung eines pluri-
kulturellen und multiethnischen Staates’, Indiana – Zeitschrift des Ibero-amerikanischen Instituts, 
Vol. 17/18, pp. 105-133. 
Laserna, Roberto (2009) ‘Decentralization, Local Initiatives, and Citizenship in Bolivia, 1994-2004’. In: 
Andrew Selee and Enrique Peruzzotti (eds) Participatory Innovation and Representative Democ-
racy in Latin America. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
Llanos, Mariana; and Leiv Marsteintredet (2009) Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. New 
York: Palgrave.  
Lucero, José Antonio (2008) Struggles of Voice. The Politics of Representation in the Andes. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Martínez Dalmau, Rubén (2008) El proceso constituyente boliviano (2006-2008) en el marco del nuevo 
constitucionalismo latinoamericano. La Paz: Enlace.  
MAS-IPSP (2009) Programa de Gobierno 2010-2015. Bolivia.  
Mujeres Creando (2007) Constitución política feminista del estado. El país imposible que miles de 
mujeres construimos todos los días. La Paz. 
Noguera, Albert (2008) Constitución, Plurinacionalidad y Pluralismo Jurídico en Bolivia. La Paz: Enlace. 
––– (2009) ‘Las formas contemporáneas de la justicia constitucional: modelos y diferencias’, Confer-
ence at the seminar on ‘Constitución y Democracia’, Universidad Andina Simón Bolivar, La Paz, 
29 October 2009. 
Nolte, Detlef; and Philipp Horn (2009) ‘Verfassungspopulismus und Verfassungswandel in Lateiname-
rika’, GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, No. 2, GIGA-Hamburg. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo; Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Osvaldo Iazzetta (2004) The Quality of Democracy. 
Theory and Applications. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press. 
Pacto de Unidad (May 2007) Propuesta consensuada del pacto de unidad. Constitución política del 
estado Boliviano. Bolivia. 
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 90, April 2011  |  21 
 
Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia (2003) Oprimidos pero no vencidos. Luchas del campesinado Aymara y 
Qhechwa 1900-1980. La Paz: Aruwiyiri. 
Rodríguez Garavito, César (2009) La Globalización del Estado de Derecho. Bogotá: Universidad de los 
Andes.  
Romero, Carlos (2005) El proceso constituyente boliviano. El hito de la cuarta marcha de tierras bajas. 
Santa Cruz: CEJIS. 
Schilling-Vacaflor, Almut (2010) Recht als umkämpftes Terrain. Die neue Verfassung und indigene 
Völker in Bolivien. Baden-Baden: Nomos.  
Schmitter, P. C. (2000) How to Democratize the European Union ... And Why Bother? Lanham/ Boul-
der/New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publ Inc. 
Sieder, Rachel (2002) ‘Introduction’. In: Rachel Sieder, (ed.) Multiculturalism in Latin America. In-
digenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy. Great Britain: Palgrave, pp. 1-23. 
Sousa Santos, Boaventura (ed.) (2005) Democratizing Demoracy. Beyond the Liberal Democratic 
Canon. London/New York: Verso.  
––– (2009) Sociología jurídica crítica. Para un nuevo sentido común en el derecho. Madrid/Bogotá: 
Trotta/ILSA. 
Stroebele-Gregor, Juliana (1994) ‘From Indio to Mestizo… to Indio: New Indianist Movements in 
Bolivia’, in: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 106-123. 
––– (2008) ‘Indigene Völker in der politischen Arena: Zum Verständnis von Politik und Demokratie bei 
indigenen Völkern in der Andenregion’, Lateinamerika Analysen, Vol. 20, pp. 125-140. 
Sunstein, Cass (2001) Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Tapia, Luis (2006a) Gobierno Multicultural y Democracia Directa Nacional. La Paz: Centro de estu-
dios y análisis estratégicos de Bolivia. 
––– (2006b) ‘Constitution and Constitutional Reform in Bolivia’. In: John Crabtree and Laurence 
Whitehead (eds) Unresolved Tensions. Bolivia Past and Present. Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press.  
––– (2007) La igualdad es cogobierno. La Paz: Plural. 
Tulchin, Joseph; Meg Ruthenberg (eds)(2007) Citizenship in Latin America. Boulder/London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.  
UNASUR (November 2008) Informe de la comisión de UNASUR sobre los sucesos de Pando. Hacia un 
alba de justicia para Bolivia. UNASUR. 
Van Cott, Donna Lee (2000) The Liquidation of the Past. The Politics of Diversity in Latin America. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
––– (2005) From Movements to Parties in Latin America. The Evolution of Ethnic Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
––– (2008) Radical Democracy in the Andes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Wolff, Jonas (2008) Turbulente Stabilität. Die Demokratie in Südamerika diesseits ferner Ideale. Ba-
den-Baden: NOMOS. 
Yrigoyen Fajardo, Raquel (eds) (2010) Pueblos Indígenas. Constituciones y Reformas Políticas en 
América Latina. Lima: IIDS. 
Zegada, María Teresa (2008) ‘Una respuesta a la exclusión social de difícil aplicación’ In: IDEA (ed.) 
Comentarios a la propuesta constitucional aprobada por la Asamblea Constituyente boliviana. La 
Paz: Plural, pp. 7-24. 
Websites 
URL http://www.cne.org.bo [April 10, 2010] 
URL http://www.cscbbol.org [April 10, 2010] 
URL http://www.conamaq.org [April 10, 2010] 
URL http://www.conamaq.org.bo [March 7, 2010] 
URL http://www.cidob-bo.org [March 7, 2010] 
22  |  Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 90, abril de 2011 
 
Interviews cited 
Ávalos, Isaac, Executive Secretary of CSUTCB, Sucre, July 2006. 
Faldin, Nélida, Representative of MAS in the Constituent Assembly and representative of OICH (Orga-
nización Indígena de los Chiquitanos), Sucre, August 2007. 
Flores, Samuel, Representative of Qhara Qhara Suyu, affiliated with CONAMAQ, August 2007. 
 
